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A STUDY IN THE ROLE OF CENTRAL AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS REGARDING THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPETITION LAW 
NAOAKI OKATANI 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the European Union, the national judicial courts of each member 
country and the European Court of Justice finally are determining whether an 
agreement constitutes an infringement of Article 81.1 of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community1 by reviewing the regime in which 
the European Commission has controlled the dispensation system defined in 
Article 81.3. 
Japan developed the Decentralization Promotion Program in 1998 based 
on the recommendations prepared by the Decentralization Promotion 
Program. The Decentralization Promotion Program defines the abolition of 
organizationally delegated operations and the enlargement of the range of 
local governmental discretion. Following the Program, Japan amended the 
Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations2 in 
1999 to abolish Section 9-5 in which the Japanese Fair Trade Commission 
(JFTC) supervised and controlled prefectural governors as well as redefine 
how the JFTC may provide technical advice and recommendations and 
request document submission and rectification. 
In many of the major developed countries like the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany, authority over the domain of competition law 
is delegated substantially to local governments, with central and local 
organizations responsible for the synergistic execution of the law. I will 
examine what form the executive authority of central and local organizations 
in Japan should take and how this should be coordinated synergistically. I 
also will discuss the relationship between the organizations in light of 
enhancing the executive power and effectiveness of Japan’s competition laws 
by increasing observation and supervisory spots supporting actions that 
restrain competition. 
 1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 3 (1997). 
 2. Futo Keihin Rui Oyobi Futo Hyoji Ho [Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading 
Representations], Act No. 134 of May 15, 1962, available at http://www.jftc.go.jp [hereinafter Act 
Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations]. 
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II. EXECUTION OF COMPETITION LAW BY STATE CARTEL OFFICES IN 
GERMANY 
A. Executive Organizations Under the Act Against Restraints of 
Competition 
Three organizations enforce the German Act Against Restraints of 
Competition (GWB)3: the Federal Cartel Office (BundesKartellamt), state 
cartel offices, and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. In 
addition, the Monopolkommission acts as an executive organization by 
conducting surveys, preparing reports, and proposing amendments based on 
the concentration status of economic power and the application status of acts 
concerning business combinations. 
1. Federal Cartel Office 
The Federal Cartel Office is an independent agency responsible for 
enforcing the GWB under the authority of the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Technology.4 It possesses jurisdiction over restraints of competition that 
influence or affect more than one province, leaving state cartel offices with 
jurisdiction over purely intrastate matters. In addition, the Office has 
exclusive authority to: (1) authorize the exemption of particular cartels from 
the GWB; (2) regulate business combinations; and (3) apply the GWB to 
postal or telecommunications services. Upon discovery of infringement, the 
Office may conduct an examination and, if appropriate, order an injunction. 
2. State Cartel Offices 
a. Coordination of Authorities Between Federal and Local 
Organizations 
The state cartel offices possess authority over issues not specifically under 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Cartel Office or the Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Technology.5 Any state office that institutes or executes any 
investigation or procedure must inform the Federal Cartel Office, and each 
must transfer any case in which it does not have jurisdiction.6 Any party 
 3. Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen [Act Against Restraints of Competition], 
26.8.1998 (BGB1. I S.1081) [hereinafter GWB]. 
 4. Id. § 51(1). 
 5. Id. § 48(2). 
 6. Id. § 49(2). 
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being investigated that questions any office’s jurisdiction may receive a 
preliminary ruling from that office, which the party may challenge 
independently.7 
b. Authority to Investigate and Issue Administrative Dispositions 
State cartel offices possess the same investigative authority as the Federal 
Cartel Office. Each may screen and examine evidence as necessary,8 
confiscate objects critical to the screening,9 and inspect and request 
documents.10 In addition, they possess the same authority as the Federal 
Cartel Office to order either any type of administrative disposition or any 
cartel participant to pay a fine. 
c. Participation of the Federal Cartel Office in Certain State 
Administrative Procedures 
The Federal Cartel Office participates in certain administrative 
procedures conducted by state cartel offices, a practice designed to ensure the 
unified operation of the GWB.11 The Federal Cartel Office also participates 
in any proceeding where parties have appealed a decision handed down by a 
state cartel office.12 The Federal Cartel Office may state its opinion or submit 
evidence in any procedure in which a state cartel office participates. In 
theory, the Federal Cartel Office could appeal any decision or legal 
interpretation made, as the language of Section 63(2) of the GWB seems to 
allow any party to a proceeding to appeal.13 
B. Evaluation of Organizations with Authority on Matters Subject to the 
GWB 
1. Outline of the Federal Cartel Office 
Part II of the GWB deals exclusively with “Cartel Authorities,” which 
applies specifically to both the Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology and the Federal Cartel Office. There are 250 staff members in 
 7. Id. § 55(1). 
 8. Id. § 57(1). 
 9. Id. § 58. 
 10. Id. § 59. 
 11. Id. § 54(3). 
 12. Id. § 67(2). 
 13. Section 63(2) states that “[t]he appeal shall be open to the parties to the proceedings before 
the cartel authority…” Id. § 63(2). 
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the Federal Cartel Office, 120 of which are attached to the Vergabekammern 
to monitor purchase orders made by ten statutory organizations, as well as 
the public purchase orders made by other organizations. 
The mission of the Vergabekammern is defined in Part IV of the GWB. 
The Vergabekammern are responsible for resolving conflicts between 
ordering divisions at the federal level and bidders concerning order 
placement. The Vergabekammern are completely autonomous and 
independent; their decision-making authority is not governed or restricted by 
any superior governing body.14 Any parties that object to a decision handed 
down by a Vergabekammer may appeal to the appropriate local court that 
possesses jurisdiction.15 
2. Budget and Sphere of Order 
The annual budget of the Federal Cartel Office is approximately DM 35 
million. The types and number of actions taken by the Office are enumerated 
in its annual Activity Reports. Execution and enforcement of the Act Against 
Unfair Competition16 (UWG) is beyond the scope of the Office’s authority. 
3. Preventative Measures 
From 1997 to 1998, the Federal Cartel Office issued measures (1) 
preventing Lufthansa from monopolizing pricing on German air routes,17 (2) 
preventing abusive interference by the Canadian film projector manufacturer 
IMAX,18 and (3) monitoring abuses in deregulated sectors such as the 
telecommunications, postal, energy, and transportation industries. 
 14. Id. § 105. 
 15. Id. § 116. 
 16. Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Act Against Unfair Competition], v. 24.3.1999 
(BGB1. I S.402). 
 17. Claiming unfair exploitation of a monopolized route, the Federal Cartel Office prohibited 
Lufthansa from charging prices on the Berlin-Frankfurt/Main route (which Lufthansa was the sole 
provider on) that were higher than it charged on similar routes within which there was actual 
competition. 
 18. The Federal Cartel Office held that IMAX’s refusal to simultaneously supply two 
proximately located cinemas in Berlin with certain large screen projection systems violated the GWB 
as an abuse with the intention to hinder, in spite of IMAX’s exclusive contract with one of the two 
cinemas. 
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4. Examinations of Business Combinations 
The Federal Cartel Office specifically conducted 3,639 examinations of 
business combinations from 1997 to 1998.19 
Table 120 
 1997 1998 
Combinations examined 
prior to merging 
1,207 1,300 
Combinations examined 
after merging that the 
Office possesses a 
specific duty to observe 
366 391 
Combinations examined 
after merging that the 
Office does not possess 
a specific duty to 
observe 
178 197 
 
Most combinations brought to the attention of the Federal Cartel 
Office were placed under preventative observation. The Office 
classified the majority of the merging firms as relatively minor firms 
that were merging with large firms for business reasons that did not 
involve anticompetitive facets. However, it is important to note that 
all large-scale mergers with significant influence over Germany’s 
markets were under strict scrutiny by the European Commission 
during the time period in question and therefore are not included in 
the tabulated figures. 
5. Competence 
Section 48 of the GWB delineates the legal basis of the federal and state 
cartel offices. Unless specifically appropriated, Section 48 indicates that the 
Federal Cartel Office retains sole authority for regulating interstate matters 
 
 
 19. See Bericht des Bundeskartellamts über seine Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1997/1998 sowie über 
die Lage und Entwicklung auf seinem Aufgabengebiet [Annual Report of the Federal Cartel Office 
1997/1998] (1998), available at http://www.bundeskartellamt.de. 
 20. Id. 
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involving discriminatory or restrictive conduct or its influence. The GWB 
specifically demarcates boundaries preventing multiple cartel offices from 
hearing the same cases to prevent disparate decisions from being made on the 
same case and issue. There currently are no plans to amend any provisions of 
the GWB related to the scope or authority of the cartel offices. 
6. Relationship Between the Federal and State Cartel Offices 
The GWB defines the relationship between the Federal and state cartel 
offices. The GWB requires the Federal Cartel Office to notify the appropriate 
state office that possesses jurisdiction over a matter if the Federal Cartel 
Office conducts an investigation or institutes any proceedings within that 
jurisdiction. Similarly, any state office that conducts an investigation or 
institutes any proceedings must inform the Federal Cartel Office of its 
actions.21 When jurisdiction demands it, the investigating cartel office must 
transfer the case to the cartel office that maintains primary jurisdiction.22 The 
Federal and state cartel offices meet annually to exchange opinions 
(Erfahrungsaustausch) about the most recent developments in case practice 
and competition law. 
C. Case Study—Nordrhein-Westfalen 
The Ministry of Economy and Middle-class, Technology, and 
Transportation (MWMEV) enforces the GWB in the state of Nordrhein-
Westfalen. To date, the MWMEV has examined issues surrounding 
interference with both energy supplier substitution and the distribution and 
authorization of cooperation by and between public and private energy-
related enterprises. It also conducted a statewide investigation into natural 
gas rates in 2000, using individual customers as its primary focus. Other 
examples of execution include enforcement of the monopolization of pricing 
of telephone directory publishing, regulation of unlawful interference by 
newspaper and magazine distributors, and regulation of restraints of 
competition arising from the granting of sweepstake sales shop contracts. 
Subjects protected under the UWG are principally different from those 
protected by the GWB. The GWB ensures free market entry and the 
existence of competition while the UWG ensures faithfulness in competition. 
Compliance with the UWG is not regulated or controlled by any central 
organization but rather is ensured through recommendations by public 
 21. GWB § 49(1). 
 22. Id. § 49(2). 
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economic organizations and the institution of civil litigation. 
The relationship between Nordrhein-Westfalen and the Federal Cartel 
Office parallels that of every other state within Germany: the GWB mandates 
that the Federal Cartel Office assume responsibility for any task or 
responsibility within Nordrhein-Westfalen where the impact of any market 
trend, restraint of competition, discriminatory practice, or competition 
provision exceeds the state boundaries.23 
D. Case Study—Bavaria 
The state cartel office in Bavaria is a division of the Department of 
Economy, Public Transport and Technology. Its primary foci include: (1) 
regulating agreements that restrain competition; (2) assisting cooperation to 
improve the efficiency of small and medium-sized enterprises; (3) regulating 
the abuse of dominant market positions; (4) policing the legality of mergers; 
(5) regulating discrimination and interference against small and medium-
sized enterprises; (6) specifically regulating agreements among the operators 
of public transportation; and (7) policing the conclusion of contracts and 
market activities in energy supply industries. 
III. INDIVIDUAL STATE ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW 
Federal law applies to all interstate transactions and state laws apply to 
purely intrastate transactions. The state attorney general not only exercises 
the antitrust law within his or her particular state but also plays an active role 
in executing federal antitrust law by pursuing actions both as a private person 
and in parens patriae actions. 
A. The Sphere of State Antitrust Laws 
1. The History of State Antitrust Law Enactment 
At least twenty-six states enacted state antitrust laws before the enactment 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890.24 One legislative purpose behind the 
Sherman Act was to enact a nationwide antitrust statute to complement these 
existing state laws that were limited strictly to intrastate application. 
The legislative movement of state antitrust law accelerated in the early 
1970s due to an increase in the number of class actions seeking treble 
 23. Id. 
 24. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994). 
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damages. States and cities recovered significant damages in actions where 
the government brought the complaint. This proliferation of successful 
litigation motivated many states to empower attorneys general to increase 
damage recovery by initiating actions in state or federal court on behalf of 
their particular states or cities or counties therein. 
In 1976, the enactment of the Antitrust Grant Program25 and the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act26 materially enhanced state 
antitrust law. The Antitrust Grant Program allocates seed money for states 
when they sue under their antitrust laws while the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s 
provision of parens patriae authority allows state attorneys general to pursue 
treble damages on behalf of persons injured by a violation of the Sherman 
Act. 
2. Current State Antitrust Law 
Every state currently has antitrust legislation in place. In addition, at least 
thirty-nine states have enacted laws that parallel Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, while fewer states possess statutes corresponding to Sections 3 
and 7 of the Clayton Act. Most states possess statutes targeting specific 
industries in addition to their laws targeting specific actions such as bid 
rigging and price fixing. Almost all states differ on the degree to which they 
rely on federal precedent when applying state antitrust law, with some 
considering federal law to be persuasive only. In addition, most state laws 
contain specific exceptions for certain industrial sectors, although the degree 
and scope of these exceptions vary from state to state. 
3. Sanctions 
Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have instituted criminal 
penalties for actions that restrain competition. The maximum fines range 
anywhere from one thousand dollars in North Carolina to one million dollars 
in Colorado. Many states also possess provisions providing for imprisonment 
in extreme cases. Many states allow treble damage awards, a determination 
ultimately delegated to the discretion of the courts. Finally, several states 
have established “antitrust revolving funds,” which are composed of a 
specific percentage of the recovery in antitrust litigation involving the state 
attorney general. In contrast with federal antitrust law, seventeen states and 
 25. The Antitrust Grant Program granted nearly thirty million dollars to state antitrust 
enforcement. See Crime Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-503 § 116, 90 Stat. 2407, 2415 (1976). 
 26. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1994). 
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the District of Columbia allow for indirect purchasers to recover for 
infringements of state antitrust laws as well as parens patriae actions to 
allow states to institute suits on behalf of their citizens. 
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT AGAINST UNJUSTIFIABLE PREMIUMS AND 
MISLEADING REPRESENTATIONS BY PREFECTURES IN JAPAN 
A. The Executing Power of Prefectures 
Section 9-4 of the Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading 
Representations enables prefectures to request reports from business owners 
regarding any premiums offered or representations made, and, if necessary, 
conduct inspections of the owners’ business premises.27 Notwithstanding this 
statutory language, prefectures handle the majority of related matters over the 
telephone, and only occasionally will require representatives of business 
organizations to attend official hearings. 
Section 9-2 of the Act provides prefectural governors with the power to 
either issue a cease and desist order to an infringing business, or publicize 
details of the business’ infringing actions.28 This remains an underutilized 
enforcement tool, as the largest number of such orders issued by prefectures 
in any one year in the 1990s was three in 1992. In addition, the period from 
1995 through 1999 saw no official orders issued at all, with the only issued 
disposition constituting an unofficial “warning.”29 
B. Relationship with the Japan Fair Trade Commission 
Section 9-3 of the Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading 
Representations provides prefectures with the authority to request the JFTC 
to “take appropriate measures” in cases where the infringing business does 
not comply with the prefectural governor’s instructions.30 Due to the low 
number of issued orders by prefectural governors, it is not surprising that 
they have not invoked their Section 9-3 authority to request JFTC 
intervention in over ten years. In addition, Section 9-6 of the Act provides the 
JFTC with the authority to require prefectural governors to correct any 
official actions they conduct that either violate the provisions of the Act or 
 27. Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations § 9-4. 
 28. Id. § 9-2. 
 29. See Kosei Torihiki Iinkai [Fair Trade Commission], Kosei Torihiki Iinkai Nenji Hokoku 
[Fair Trade Commission Annual Report] 108-9 (2000). 
 30. Act Against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations § 9-3. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p451 Okatani book pages.doc  10/15/02   3:13 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
460   WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 1:451 
 
 
 
 
 
clearly impair the public interest.31 Similar to Section 9-3, the JFTC has not 
exercised its authority under Section 9-6 in at least ten years. However, the 
relationship and cooperation between the prefectures and the JFTC extend 
beyond actual enforcement. The staff members of the prefectures meet with 
the JFTC twice per year to discuss training, enforcement, and all relevant and 
current policy concerns. 
C. Challenges 
The most noticeable challenge facing enforcement of the Act Against 
Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations involves the severe 
limitation on available administrative resources. Of primary concern is the 
fact that the entire staff in each prefecture usually is limited to one or two 
individuals, with each staff member concurrently responsible for a range of 
other related and miscellaneous duties. In addition, from 1995 to 1999, no 
prefecture issued an official disposition relating to an infringement of the 
Act. This lack of enforcement activity necessitates a closer examination of 
prefectural enforcement, as any improperly enforced regulation truly is not 
worth the paper it originally was transcribed on. Consequently, certain issues 
should be examined if and when prefectures ever assume executive authority 
for antitrust law enforcement: (1) ensure each prefecture possesses a 
professional staff, sufficient budget, and efficient organizational structure; (2) 
foster complete and unadulterated professionalism in enforcement; and (3) 
ensure transparency of execution. 
V. ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 
The fact that prefectures possess even a small measure of enforcement 
authority gives the impression that this extended antitrust presence will lead 
to the increased prevention of infringing actions. However, any enforcement 
by the prefectures will be only moderately effective without heightened 
cooperation between the prefectures and the JFTC to coordinate and 
harmonize the uniform application of all antitrust laws. One only need 
examine the cooperation between Germany’s federal and state cartel offices 
to see the benefits of such an approach. Due to the limitations on 
administrative resources and enforcement experience, a framework akin to 
Germany’s cooperative, distributive enforcement of one universal 
competition law based on sphere of influence would benefit Japan far more 
than applying separate competition laws at differing levels would, as the 
 
 31. Id. § 9-6. 
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United States has found success with. The success of such a framework 
would be dependent on increased coordination between Japan’s central and 
local governments, increased scrutiny of and participation in prefecture 
procedures by the JFTC, and the establishment of an organized system for 
the consistent exchange of the most current information and suggested policy 
measures. 
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